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Abstract. This paper presents the main definitions relating to dependability. Basic definitions including reliability, security, maintainability, etc. are 
described first. They are then supplemented by additional definitions, which address to the threats of dependability (faults, errors, failures). Overlapping 
dependability standards, renumbering and integration can cause uncertainty when using of a certain definition. For this purpose, authors present 
complemented fault taxonomy for fault-tolerant real-time systems to eliminate inconsistencies and to unify existing fault taxonomies. 
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ZMODYFIKOWANA, UZUPEŁNIONA TAKSONOMIA USTEREK W TOLERUJĄCYCH AWARIE 
SYSTEMACH CZASU RZECZYWISTEGO 
Streszczenie. W artykule przedstawiono najważniejsze definicje dotyczące słowności. Podstawowe definicje w tym niezawodność, bezpieczeństwo, 
obsługiwalność, itp. opisane są w pierwszej kolejności. Następnie są one uzupełniane dodatkowymi definicjami, które odnoszą się do zagrożeń słowności 
(usterki, błędy, awarie). Nakładające się standardy słowności, renumeracja i integracja mogą spowodować niepewność przy korzystaniu z pewnych 
definicji. W tym celu autorzy przedstawiają uzupełnioną taksonomię usterek w tolerujących błędy systemach czasu rzeczywistego. Celem jest 
wyeliminowanie niespójności oraz unifikacji istniejących taksonomii usterek. 
Słowa kluczowe: usterki, taksonomia, klasyfikacja, słowność 
Introduction 
The problem of reliable computing is as old as the first 
computers appear which used electric switches, mechanical relays, 
vacuum tubes, etc. The era of modern computing began with a 
flurry of technical development before and during World War II. 
Computer systems while the early 40’s were slowed by various 
problems, including relatively unreliable components, complex 
equipments, cumbersome operations, and component 
synchronization imperfections. The invention of the transistor 
could be considered as an important milestone of computer system 
reliability. However, much more strict and demanding reliability 
requirements were caused by the space program in the early 60's, 
as well as by other real-time safety-critical practical applications 
where human lives could be threatened by a computer system 
failure.  
The concept of fault tolerance unifies different approaches to 
system reliability by means of testing, diagnosis, prediction, 
redundancy in hardware and software, etc. It emerged in the late 
60's when more emphasis was given to reliability testing on 
component and system level. Moreover, the first reliability 
standards were created at that time, namely military standard 781, 
military handbook 217. The concept of fault tolerance in 80’s 
became more formalized due to International Organization for 
Standardization and its stand-alone International Electrotechnical 
Commission and reached maturity with the formation of the IEEE 
Computer Society Technical Committee on Fault-Tolerant 
Computing in 1969 [1].  
Nowadays, there are a various combinations of national and 
international standards, government organizations, professional 
societies which have promulgated a dizzying number of system 
dependability standards, guidelines, recommended practices, 
rapports and other frameworks [4]. However, the majority of 
standard define only the basic term of fault, errors or failure 
without indentations in their properties, types, and relationships. 
This paper aims to give precise definitions characterizing the 
various types of faults that come into play when addressing the 
dependability and security of computing and communication fault-
tolerant systems. Furthermore, article aims to complement and 
unify existing fault taxonomies to eliminate inconsistencies and 
overlapping terms. 
1. Dependability in fault-tolerant real-time system 
Many terms can be used informally to describe the desired 
result that a system performs without going wrong. Besides the 
reliability, dependability is one of the key and expected system 
requirements. The term dependability seems not to be clearly 
defined. Therefore different meanings are cited:  
 The original definition of dependability is the ability to deliver 
service that can justifiably be trusted [6]. In a broad sense, 
dependability includes its related attributes namely, reliability, 
availability, safety as well as maintainability. Fig. 1 summarizes 
the relationship between dependability and its principal attributes. 
 According to [4] dependability is a form of availability that 
has the property of always being available when required. It is the 
degree to which a system is operable and capable of performing its 
required operation at any randomly chosen time during its specific 
operating time, on condition that the system is available at the start 
of the period. 
 
Fig. 1. Dependability and its attributes 
Being fault tolerant is strongly related to what is called 
dependable system. A fault-tolerant real-time system is capable of 
performing the operations with satisfactory performance even if 
one or several faults, or more critically, one or several failures 
occur in this system [12]. Moreover, system is not only required to 
deliver correct results but also timely results. Thus, a system is 
dependable if it exhibits a high probability of behaving according 
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to its specification. How high is it? This naturally depends on the 
purpose of the target system: the requirements of a life-supporting 
system and of a game console are quite different as well as nuclear 
power plant control system and light control system in a 
residential stairwell have completely not comparable requirement 
levels. The consequences of a failure are much more dramatic in 
life-supporting systems and in nuclear power plant control 
systems than in a gaming machine or in living illumination 
systems. The knowledge of the required degree of dependability 
entails the awareness of the impairments to dependability, i.e., the 
potential causes for incorrect behavior (faults, errors, failures) and 
the possible ways of their elimination. 
2. Threats to dependability: faults, errors, failures 
A fault-tolerant real-time system provides continuous, safe 
operation in the presence of faults. This system must detect errors 
caused by faults, assess the damage caused by the fault, recover 
from the error, and isolate the fault. The faults the system is to be 
designed to tolerate must be defined based on analysis of high 
requirements including the probability of each fault occurring, and 
the impact on the system performance in general [11]. 
In everyday language, the terms fault, failure, and error are 
used interchangeably. In fault-tolerant computing, however, they 
have distinctive meanings. A fault is an unpermitted deviation of 
at least one characteristic property (feature) of the system from the 
acceptable, usual, standard condition. A fault corresponds to an 
abnormal behavior of the system, which may not affect the overall 
functioning of the system but may eventually lead to a failure. 
A failure is a permanent interruption of a system’s ability to 
perform a required function under specified operating conditions. 
Resulting from one or more faults, a failure is therefore an event 
that terminates the functioning of a unit in the system or a system 
as a whole (critical failure). 
An error is a discrepancy between a computed, observed or 
measured value or condition, and the true, specified or 
theoretically correct value or condition [9]. An error within a 
system may be caused by fault of one or more of its components, 
or by the activation of a systematic fault.  
According to [5] the relationship between terms fault, failure 
and error is illustrated in Fig. 2. That is, an error leads to a failure 
event (unless the error is not removed), and the last leads to the 
fault state.  
 
Fig. 2. The difference between failure, fault, and error 
However, according to [8] an error may lead to a failure–a 
failure occurs when the error causes the delivered service to 
deviate from correct service. A fault is the cause of an error, and 
an error is the cause of a failure. The relationship between fault, 
failure and error is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. The relationship between failure, fault, and error 
Dependability as well as its threats differs in its meaning in 
some standards, e.g. MIL HDBK, IEC, DIS, etc. Organizations 
have different overlapping standards difficult to know which are 
applicable for a given situation or system. Therefore, many
authors referring to the same standards confuse the reader. In this 
article, the authors tend to [8] explanation, where a fault is the 
cause of an error, and an error is the cause of a failure. 
In any fault-tolerant real-time system, the range of potential 
fault that is quite large; enumerating all such possibilities is a vital 
yet formidable task in validating the system’s readiness for 
deployment. 
3. A taxonomy of faults 
“A fault is an unpermitted deviation of at least one 
characteristic property (feature) of the system from the acceptable, 
usual, standard condition.” [7]. Based on this definition, a fault 
corresponds to an abnormal behavior of the system, leading to the 
inability to perform as required, due to an internal state, which 
may not affect the overall functioning of the system but may 
eventually lead to a failure of one or several components. As 
suggested in [3] faults could be categorized in several ways 
according to eight basic viewpoints: phase of creation or 
occurrence, system boundaries, phenomenological cause, 
dimension, objective, intent, capability, persistence (duration). 
Additional viewpoints, namely extent and nature have been 
appeared in [4]. Classifications of faults in a tree form have been 
depicted in [10] with mode, domain and value viewpoints. Fig. 4 
shows a complemented taxonomy of faults all aforementioned and 
suggested few extra viewpoints. 
The new classification of faults includes several new 
viewpoints (classes). The classification of viewpoints is as 
follows: 
1. The fault detection class indicates a capability of fault to be 
detected. Thus, faults could be distinguished as detected and 
undetected. Detected faults are subdivided into targeted and 
accidentally detected faults. Fault detection techniques are 
used to diagnose the presence of faults so that adequate 
countermeasures can be taken to prevent failures. 
2. The simplicity of the faults: 
A simple fault is a fault that can be fixed by making a single 
change to a source statement. A complex fault is a fault that 
cannot be fixed by making a single change to a source 
statement. Terms simple and complex faults have never been 
formally defined, we introduce the working definitions only. 
3. The sensitivity of the faults: 
According IEC 192-04-13 and IEC 192-04-14, data sensitive 
fault is a fault that is only activated when particular data are 
encountered. Program sensitive fault is a fault that is only 
activated when a particular sequence of program steps is 
executed. Generally these types of faults are for software only, 
but also could appear in hardware as well. 
4. Two types of faults are considered relating to the correlation 
class: independent and related faults. Related faults result 
from a fault in a common specification or from dependencies 
in a separate design and implementation 
5. The plurality class of the faults: 
Single fault is a fault caused by one adverse physical or one 
harmful human action. Multiple faults are two or more 
concurrent, overlapping or sequential single faults whose 
consequence, e.g. failures, errors, etc.  
6. The style of the faults: 
An omission fault occurs of not doing something system 
should has done (the absence of actions when it should be) A 
commission fault occurs when a component generates 
incorrect results or when wrong actions are performed.  
7. The ability to identify the activation pattern of a fault that had 
caused one or more errors is the fault activation 
reproducibility. Faults can be categorized according to their 
activation reproducibility [2]:  
Faults whose activation is reproducible are called solid faults, 
whereas faults whose activation is not systematically 
reproducible are elusive faults. 
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Fig. 4. Taxonomy of faults
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4. Conclusion 
Nowadays, developing sophisticated fault-tolerant real-time 
systems is required by public and private bodies. Simultaneous 
consideration of dependability provides a very convenient tool 
uniting various concerns within a single conceptual framework. 
Dependability includes such attributes as availability, reliability, 
safety, confidentiality, integrity, maintainability. However, despite 
the wide network of different national and international standards 
bodies the terminology differences are the largest potential 
problem. Due to consideration such as need for consistency within 
a set of standards, intended audience and conceptual organization, 
dependability as well as its attribute definitions differ in some 
standards, e.g. MIL HDBK, IEC and DIS. Organizations have 
different overlapping standards difficult to know which are 
applicable for a given situation. Moreover, the latest dependability 
standards do not outline even half of the presented fault classes. 
Therefore, the fault taxonomy aims to unify and to complement 
existing fault taxonomies to eliminate inconsistencies, 
renumbering and overlapping terms. Also, the taxonomy has been 
created to simplify the verbal description and to improve the 
adequacy of the models. 
This article considers only elementary fault classes, however 
presented taxonomy does not include a complete picture of faults 
in fault-tolerant systems (for example authors do not consider the 
taxonomy of hardware or human faults). Moreover, complemented 
taxonomy only states the fact of its existence and does not cover 
the relationship between the presented fault classes. 
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